The detection of matchfixing is a multi-stepped process.
Firstly, one requires access to betting patterns in both the public and the Dark Pool markets.
Suspicious structures may be extracted from these individual data and the interferences between the two market strata.
These patterns might take many different forms dependent on the mode and loci of the corruption together with the methods utilised to disguise the fixing of the game.
Experienced market analysts however are able to determine the insider trading patterns from the general background noise.
Secondly, the betting patterns must be traced back to the particular matchfixing operation(s) behind the corruption.
This is a tricky process as the fixers frequently use proxies to hide the source of the trading in much the same way as money launderers evade tax by moving monies between different Offshore Financial Centres or the manner in which Tor disguises internet activities via proxy servers.
We are fortunate in that we are linked to one particular market maker who exchanges such access for our analytical inputs to the marketplace.
Thirdly, one checks for positive correlations between the insider trading and the performances of individuals on the field of play.
For robustness, a directory of numerous matches must be compiled so that statistical significance can be achieved and perpetrators exposed.
At this point, in a world of integrity, the bodies that allegedly monitor matchfixing should be going public and taking action against the miscreants.
Unfortunately, it is at this point that the futility and lack of fitness for purpose of Early Warning, Federbet, Europol, Interpol and the English FA's Sports Betting Integrity Unit becomes evident.
In the period ahead we are going to disclose some suspicious betting patterns from football matches in the last decade up to the present day.
Although we are not willing in this place to go beyond the initial stage of detection for legal reasons, we will show that bookmakers and institutional bodies set up to confront matchfixing are, in many cases, either treating such occurrences as competitive advantage in the market and/or totally ignoring the impact on the integrity of the game.
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Reading The Markets
To be able to understand the market in the two matches addressed below, we need to explain features of the visual representation.
The Price-Volume charts are from Betfair.
The two primary charts display Price (upper chart) and Volume (lower chart) - the smaller charts at the top of the screenshot are replications of the lower ones.
The Price and Volume are split into red, blue and green for home team, away team and draw.
The solid green block along the x-axis indicates when the match went in-play.
The Volume is measured in pounds sterling.
The images are blurred deliberately for security reasons.
The two sample events detailed below are very simplistic examples of attempts at matchfixing/insider trading.
The interest lies in the fact that the Premier League game was allowed to exist in a world of dubious integrity while the gamble in the Champions League match was not landed.
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Manchester United 2 Crystal Palace 0 (Sep 14th 2013)
Manchester United won this match via a fake penalty where the foul took place yards outside the penalty area and where the resultant sending off was fallacious. Prior to these decisions, the match was even and competitive.
53 minutes prior to kick off there had been a significant market breakpoint on Man Utd followed by another trade of £536,000 20 minutes later. These trades totalled £840,000 and represented 30% of the total volume traded on Man Utd up to that point at Betfair (the next highest trade on the day of the match had been just £70K).
This market was suspicious and is generally a structure that would indicate insider trading and should have been reported to the matchfixing monitoring bodies and to the Premier League.
Shakhtar Donetsk 0 Juventus 1 (Dec 5th 2012)
This match was interesting in that it was ideal territory for an agreed draw (which would have seen both sides qualify for the 2nd Phase of the Champions League at the expense of Chelsea).
The first meeting between the two teams in the Group Stage was widely regarded by trading professionals as an agreed draw.
Throughout the day money piled on the draw.
At kick off 70% of volume at Betfair was on the draw.
But the professional gamblers had overlooked one other aspect of the game - a victory for Juve would also see both teams progress. And a victory for Juve is exactly what they got via an own goal from Shakhtar's Olexandr Kucher following a Stephan Liechsteiner offside that was not given by the assistant referee.
UEFA, like the Bundesliga, does not appreciate insider trading and/or matchfixing on events under their jurisdiction and, off the record, we have been told that the agreed draw option was never allowed on the table.
This post is just a taster of future ones where more detailed analyses of the betting patterns on corrupt structures will be undertaken.
We will be looking at corrupted referees, matchfixing that determined a Premier League relegation, the activities of gambling clubs, dodgy goalkeepers who monetise their fraud in the marketplace, the utilisation of grey market corruptions by league authorities to offset black market matchfixing by criminal gangs, betting patterns associated with 3 for 3 and 2 for 2 seasonal sharing of points, abuses of integrity by bookmakers that own football clubs and the different forms of matchfixing in EPL, Serie A and La Liga etc etc etc.
Omertà no more!
